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Calendar
March 2-"The Physician and the Lawyer in Court," a panel discussion
under auspices of the Colorado Medical Society and the Joint Professional Committee of Colorado Bar Association, 8 p.m., Lincoln
Room, Shirley-Savoy Hotel.

Judicial Reform
By WM.

HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
President, Colorado Bar Association

It would be a high crime if after all of the work which the committee
on judicial administration has done over the past three years and the money
which has been expended on the program, if the judicial reform program
failed in the legislature because of negligence by the attorneys of this state.
The judicial amendment and bills are important and well conceived legislation.
As you all will recall, the committee gathered statistics of the courts in
this state, and studied the judicial systems of other states and nations. The
plan has been approved by practically every local bar association in-this state.
It has been endorsed by most of the major groups interested in civic affairs,
and has not been disapproved by any of them. It has been endorsed by both
of the Denver daily papers.
Unfortunately, however, the issue raised by this legislation is not an
exciting one. Popular fancy cannot be captured by this program. It has to
depend for its passage upon the solid and untiring efforts of all lawyers who
desire improvement in our judicial system. Our legislature, burdened with
many hundreds of bills, must be acquainted with the need of this legislation.
Please write your legislators, telling them why it should be passed. The numbers of the constitutional amendment and bills are:
House
Senate
2
1
Constitutional amendment (concurrent resolution)
152
305
Additional powers of Chief Justice
153
307
Organization of Judicial Council
154
308
Retirement pay for judges
Removal of limitation on the judicial salaries
174
306
increase after 1950
482
297
Salary increase for court employees
See the article by Stanley W. Johnson in the December, 1948, issue of
DICTA for information concerning the substance of these bills.
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Please, let's all cooperate as a unified bar to get this important legislation
passed. We have discussed this matter for years; now let's get some positive
action.

Joint Bar-Medical Society Panel
Scheduled for March 2
Attorneys and doctors will come to friendly grips in a panel discussion
on "The Physician and the Lawyer in Court," at 8 o'clock on March 2, 1949,
in the Lincoln Room of the Shirley-Savoy Hotel.
The program is being held in connection with a state-wide meeting of
the Colorado Medical Society, and is sponsored on behalf of the Colorado
Bar Association by the Joint Committee on Professions. That committee is
composed of Ronald Yegge, chairman; Sam S. Sherman, Jr., and T. Raber
Taylor.
All members of the bar are invited to be guests of the medical society
on this occasion. Further details of the discussion will be sent to bar association members by post card notice later in the month.

Radio Program Gathers Public Interest
As the Colorado Bar Association's radio program "You and The Law"
swings into its fifth week, there are reliable indications of an increasing public
interest and an expanding audience.
An encouraging number of requests have been received from listeners for
the leaflets on wills and the court plan offered at the conclusion of the second
and third programs. The experts estimate that the KFEL broadcast from
Denver is being listened to by a normal audience of 15,000, even though
network arrangements made it necessary to change the time of the broadcast
from Sunday at 8:15 p.m. to Thursday evenings at 8:30 p.m.
Proportionally, the program's audience in the smaller cities has been
even greater, and the office of the secretary has been kept busy answering
requests for the leaflets. Not infrequently the correspondents take time out
to compliment the bar association and the radio council for the excellence
of the program.
The two leaflets which are being distributed on request are "Wills-Their
Importance and Why You Should Have One" and "The Colorado Bar Association's Plan to: Take The Courts Out of Politics! Take Politics Out of The
Courts!" The wills leaflet is also receiving extensive distribution through the
banks by inclusion in the monthly statements, as well as by the local bar associations and individual lawyers.
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Judge Burke Lauded in Commemorative Meeting
On the occasion of Judge Haslett
P. Burke's last appearance on the
Supreme Court on January 10, 1949,
the officers and Board of Governors
of the Colorado Bar, acting for that
association and representatives of the
local associations, held a commemora-

tive meeting in the Supreme Court
inJudge Burke's honor.

The remarks of the present and
past presidents of the Colorado Bar
Association made on that occasion
are printed herewith.

Wn. Hedges Robinson, Jr.
President, Colorado Bar Association
Honorable Justices, Mr. Attorney General and
Fellow Members of the Bar:
Today, we wish to mark an important date in the judicial history of this
state. It is the desire of the legal profession to acknowledge publicly the
personal integrity, the willingness to work, the capacity for judicial administration, and the sense of humaneness of Justice Burke.
Your Honors, before this bar today are representatives of the local bar
associations of the state, the officials of the Colorado Bar Associations, past
and present, who have come to pay their respects to a venerated judge whose
long and honorable term of office expires today. May I, therefore, present
Mr. Thomas M. Burgess, former president of the Colorado Bar Association,
with the request that he may address this court on behalf of our association
and the lawyers throughout the state.
Thomcm MK Burgess
Past President, Colorado Bar Association
I ask the permission of the Court to, at this time, address a few remarks
in a matter which involves no controversial questions. It is indeed an honor
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and a signal privilege to appear before the Bar of this Court upon this
occasion. I am appearing in my own behalf, and as the representative and
spokesman of every member of the Bar of this State. It is the first time, and
probably will be the last time, that I will ever appear in this Court when
what I have to say will bear the endorsement and approval of the entire
Bench and Bar, as it does today.
The Bar of every section of the State is represented here this morning.
The attendance is, of necessity, limited by the lack of sufficient space, but
if the walls of this room could have been pushed back so as to accommodate
all of those who wish to appear here, there is not a member of the Bench
or Bar who would not be present on this occasion.
A few short months ago, Mr. Chief Justice Burke announced that
upon the expiration of his present term, it was his choice to retire. That
term of official service to the Bench and Bar, and the people of Colorado,
expires today. We are gathered here to pay our respects, and to express our
gratitude for the long, enviable and outstanding services of our Mr. Chief
Justice Burke.
I made my first appearance before this Court in 1927. Justice Burke
was then serving his first of three terms as Chief Justice. The occasion for
my appearance was the oral examination upon my application for admission
to the Bar. There were about thirty other applicants. We had each made
a careful outside inquiry as to what we might expect in the examination.
The older practicing attorneys had advised us that the oral examination
would not be particularly difficult unless we happened to be examined by
Chief Justice Burke. And in that event, we could be sure that he would
ask questions on subjects for which we would be wholly unprepared. The
names of the applicants were called in alphabetical order, and each of the
Justices took his turn in the examination of one applicant. My position in
the alphabet gave Justice Burke the opportunity to call me as his first
prize. I approached this table with a hesitant step and an unusually rapid pulse.
Then I glanced up, and I saw the kindly, fatherly face and the twinkling
eyes of the Chief Justice. With that momentary glance, my fears vanished
and we proceeded with the examination. I have never forgotten that kindly
expression which gave me confidence, and I shall cherish its memory forever.
Every member of the Bench and Bar who has been admitted to practice
since 1919 has had a similar experience, until today, more than three-fourths
of the practicing lawyers in this State proudly display their certificate of
admission bearing the signature of Haslett P. Burke.
We all know that for a period of thirty years, Mr. Justice Burke has
sat on this Court interpreting, construing and establishing the law of this
State, with such distinction and honor that he has won the praise of the
Bench and Bar of the entire country. We may not be so familiar with all
of his past history and accomplishments. I could not pass without mentioning
a few of the many items of interest and records of service of such an illustrious person.
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He was born in Iowa, seventy-four years ago, and attended the public
schools of that State. It was not his privilege to enroll in one of the present
day well-equipped law schools, but he sought his legal knowledge, well serving
as a clerk and stenographer for a law firm. He was admitted to the Iowa
Bar in 1896, and during that same year, moved to Colorado where he was
immediately admitted to the Bar of this State.
He served as a Corporal in the Signal Corps in the Spanish-American War,
and then returned to take over the duties of Clerk of the District Court of
Logan County in 1901. In 1906, the people of the Thirteenth Judicial District correctly identified the mind of a great jurist and placed him on the
District Bench. And he served in that capacity until 1919 when the people
of the State commanded him to commence his long term of continuous service
on this Bench.
Although his duties on the Bench required long hours and arduous
labor, he was none the less, at all times, available for additional assignments.
In 1907 he organized the Thirteenth Judicial District Bar Association, and
has continuously maintained an active membership and interest in that group.
He has been a member of both the Colorado Bar Association and the
American Bar Association for more than forty years, and his sound advice
and able assistance has always been available to those Associations.
In addition to all of these activities, he has in the past found time to
serve as a lecturer on Constitutional Law at Denver University; he has
served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration between Western Railroads
and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen; he has been President of the
Board of Trustees of Clayton College. In 1941 he chose to continue his
service on this Bench in preference to the honor of the tendered appointment
as United States Senator.
After forty-two years of continuous service on the Bench, and after
more than fifty years of service to the people of our state, Mr. Chief Justice
Burke has chosen to officially retire from the Bench. We cannot, and will
not, however, permit him to terminate his services to the people of Colorado,
or to the Bar of this State. Upon the ending of his arduous duties here today,
he will have more time to devote to his -many other interests, and we trust and
hope that we can continue to look forward to calling upon him for his able
advice and assistance.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, there are no mere words which can express
our appreciation and gratitude for your many able years of service to the
Bench and Bar of this State. We deeply regret to extend our greetings to
you on the Bench for the last time today. Your able opinions and your
sound judgment will be sorely missed. Your chair will be occupied by a
succession of others, but there will never be another Justice Burke in the
hearts of the people and the lawyers of Colorado. The lawyers of Colorado
wish to retain a permanent spot in your thoughts, and as a small expression
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of gratitude for your services, and in honor of your official retirement, it
gives me great pleasure on behalf of the Colorado Bar Association, to present
you with this clock. We only hope that whenever you glance at the time
of day, this timepiece will constantly reflect the respect and affection which
the members of the Bar hold for you.

Law Office Management Institute
An analysis by Ralph B. Mayo of the fiscal records of a law office, and
a lively panel discussion by Lewis Dick, Merrill Knight and Harold Taft
King on other law office management problems, constituted the second 1948-49
Institute of the Denver Bar Association on January 8 in the Telephone Company auditorium.
Not more than a hundred lawyers, secretaries and students braved the
rigors of the weather to sit-in on the discussion of this very mundane but
necessary phase of a lawyer's existence. Those who did found it rewarding.
For those who failed to attend, but who are interested in the accounting
half of the institute, there are still available a limited supply of Mr. Mayo's
"Outline of Accounting System for Large, Middle and Small Attorneys at
Law." So regardless of your waistband, you may have a copy for the asking,
while they last, at the association's office.

Denver Bar Books Audited
An audit of the books of the Denver Bar Association was completed
recently by Norman H. Gross & Co., Certified Public Accountants, and a
modern, simplified system of accounting was installed.
The survey and audit was performed by Mr. Gross and his associates
as a favor to the bar association without charge through the good offices of
William L. Branch, chairman of the Auditing Committee.
At a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the association on February 1,
1949, Mr. Branch, reporting for his committee, described the results of the
survey and recommended bonding of the secretary-treasurer and an annual
audit. Both recommendations were accepted by the Board, which also gave
a vote of thanks to Mr. Gross and his associates for making possible this
much-needed improvement in the fiscal management of the association.

Admitted to a Higher Court
Since the last notice in-DICTA, the following members of the Denver bar
have died: Charles E. Compton, James D. Parriott, Richard Peete and Thomas
L. Pollock. Word also has been received of the death of the following members of the Colorado Bar Association: Leonard E. Anderson of Brush and
William R. Babb of Greeley.
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Current Decisions In Constitutional Law
BY EDWARD H. SHERMAN
of the Denver Bar

!

EDITOR'S NOTE-With this issue, DICTA presents this new feature which Mr. Sherman graciously has consented to write each month, always providing there is sufficient
interesting grist for the mill. Mr. Sherman, in addition to being an active practitioner,
serves as lecturer on Constitutional Law at the University of Denver College of Law
and is, therefore, eminently qualified to handle the subject. He will attempt to keep you
abreast of interesting and significant decisions in both the Federal and state courts.

State Prohibition of Closed Shop Held ConstitutionalIn a series of significant decisions, the Supreme Court measured the constitutional validity of the prohibition by the states of Nebraska, Arizona and
North Carolina of the closed shop and of closed shop contracts by constitutional or statutory measures and held that they did not conflict with the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that prohibition of the closed
shop did not interfere with freedom of speech, assembly or petition which
guarantees did not extend to exclude non-union workers from employment
in order to aid the bargaining position of a union. The court further held
that these state provisions were not an unconstitutional impairment of the
obligations of existing contracts or a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The majority opinion written by Justice Black and presuming to follow
the philosophy of the Nebbia, Parish, Darby and Phelps-Dodge cases, answered
the contention that due process had been violated by the retort that states
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in
their internal, commercial and business affairs. They are not to be put in a
straight jacket by judicial construction when they seek the suppression of
those conditions which they regard as offensive to the public welfare. "Just
as we have held that the Due Process clause erects no obstacle to block legislative protection of union members, we now hold that legislative protection
can be afforded non-union workers."
The decisions foreshadow validity of the closed shop provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Law and it would seem that the fight on behalf of labor to
validate the closed shop must now be on the political front.
An interesting reservation to the decision is found in the concurring
opinion of Justices Rutledge and Murphy in one of the cases. Their opinion
reserves the question whether a state may constitutionally foreclose the right
to strike by making illegal the refusal of union members to work with nonunion members and does not pass upon the question of whether a state may
enjoin such a strike. (Lincoln Federal Labor Union, A. F. of L. v. North-
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western Iron and Metal Company, et al; Whitaker v. State of North Carolina;
American Federationof Labor v. American Sash and Door Company, 69 S. Ct.
251-268.)
A State May Constitutionally Forbid Women From Being BarmaidsAlthough the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet been
called upon to measure the validity of a state statute which would frustrate
the barfly or circumscribe his liberty, in Goesaert v. Cleary, 69 S. Ct. 198,
it was confronted with a question whether Michigan could forbid females
from being barmaids and at the same time make an exception of the wives
and daughters of the owners of liquor establishments. The court held that
equal protection of the laws and due process did not bar Michigan from forbidding bartending by women and at the same time allowing the wives and
daughters of the owners to engage in this pursuit. To paraphrase the court, it
cannot be said that there is no rationale justifying the manner in which the
Michigan legislature has answered its moral and social problems. They may have
drawn a line which is not without a basis in reason. It is for Michigan to decide
whether it shall withdraw from women the occupation of bartending and
yet allow them to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed. It is also
within their province whether the wives and daughters of owners of liquor
establishments shall be allowed to engage in bartending. Three Judges,
however, (Rutledge, Douglas and Murphy) thought the statute one which
arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor establishments. The decision is significant in Colorado, however, where a somewhat similar statute has been presented to the legislature for passage.
The Right to Privacy and Unlawful Search and SeizureThe guarantees of the 4th amendment regarding unreasonable searches
and seizures are again dissected and defined in McDonald v. United States,
69 S. Ct. 191. Here the defendant had been under surveillance by the police
for about two months. He was observed entering a rooming house where
he had rented a room. There was no warrant for his arrest, nor a search
warrant. While outside the house one of the police thought he heard an
adding machine. Believing that a "numbers game" was in progress, one of
the officers opened a window leading into the land-lady's room and climbed
through. The other officers followed. They proceeded to the second floor
and one of the officers stood on a chair and looked through a transom. He
observed the defendants as well as numbers slips, money and adding machines. The defendants were thereupon arrested. The court held that this
evidence should have been suppressed where offered in a Federal court. The
guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to the innocent and guilty alike. The officers were not responding to an
emergency. There were not exceptional circumstances to justify a search
without a warrant. The defendant was not fleeing nor was the property in
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process of destruction. The inconvenience of the officers and the delay in
procuring a search warrant does not justify violating the constitutional requirement. (The Chief Justice, Justices Burton and Reed dissented).
The practitioner also might well note the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Upshaw v. U. S., 69 S.Ct. 170. Though
the holding in this case is expressly not placed on constitutional grounds, the
defendant was convicted of grand larceny in a United States District Court
and sought to exclude confessions of guilt which were admitted against his
objection that they have been illegally obtained. The confessions had been
made during a 30 hour period while defendant was held a prisoner after
police had arrested him on suspicion and without a warrant. The defendant's
objection to the admissibility of the confessions rested on Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. and the ruling in the
NcNabb case, 63 S.Ct. 608. The court held that the practice of arresting,
holding and questioning a person on mere suspicion, although in accordance
with usual police procedures, is in violation of law and confessions thus obtained are inadmissible. (four justices dissenting).
The Constitutional Right to CounselDoes the due process clause of the 14th amendment or the 5th amendment require counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes? In Eveges
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 69 S.Ct. 184, the court considered this
Federal constitutional question as to denial of counsel. The defendant, 17
years of age, was faced with four indictments charging four separate burglaries. He pleaded guilty and thereafter petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging, among other things, that he was not informed of his right to
counsel nor was counsel offered him at any time during the period between
arrest and conviction. The record showed no attempt on the part of the trial
court to make him understand the consequences of his plea nor was he advised
of his right to counsel. The court held that the opportunity to have counsel
was a necessary element of a fair hearing and reversed the conviction.
The opinion reveals an interesting conflict among the justices as to
the true rule. For some, whenever a serious offense is charged the failure of the court to offer counsel in state criminal trials, deprives an accused of rights under the 14th amendment. For the others, when a crime
subject to capital punishment is not involved, each case depends upon its
own facts such as the gravity of the crime, the age and education of the
defendant, the conduct of the court, etc.-all the circumstances which in the
nature of the case might result in injustice without the aid of counsel.
Unlawful Delegation of PowersA law providing for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes arising
in public utilities or hospitals by a board, of which a circuit judge of a state
is the chairman, with the power to make binding determination of the issues
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involved, was held unconstitutional in 'Michigan upon the sole issue that it
was an attempt to confer non-judicial powers and duties upon a judicial officer,
duties, Local 170 Transport Workers Union of America v. Gabola, 34 NW
2d 71. The court intimated that compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in
the area of public utilities and hospitals may, under police power, be constitutionally permissible. Neverthless the court held that the act as written
violated an independent judiciary.
Miscegenation-Freedom of the PressTwo other interesting state court decisions.--(1) In Perez v. Lippold,
198 P. 2d 17, the California Supreme Court held that the California
miscegenation law declaring illegal the marriage of white persons and Negroes,
Mongolians and members of the Malay race, was unconstitutional. One
should compare this decision with the decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court, Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colorado 196.
(2) A Wisconsin court balanced the police power of the state in providing punishment for publishing in a newspaper or periodical the identity
of a female who may have been criminally assaulted or raped as against the
contention that such punishment violated the freedom of the press. The
court favored the exercise of such police power as a greater social value under
the circumstances of the case. State v. Evjue, 33 NW 2d 305.

Time Extended on Essay Contest
Final date for submission of essays on Administrative Law of Colorado
has been extended to September 1, 1949, by American Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law. Time within which contestants must be elected
to membership in the American Bar Association to qualify in the contest has
been extended to August 1, 1949.
Contest prizes are $150.00 to the Colorado lawyer submitting the best
essay on Colorado Administrative Law, awarded by the Colorado Bar Association, and $1000.00 for the best essay submitted from any state, awarded
by the American Bar Association.
The rules for the contest and instructions on where to submit the essays
were published in DICTA, May 1948 issue. Further information may be had
from Milton J. Keegan, Colorado chairman, 1210 First National Bank Bldg.,
Denver.
Pleasant President of Northwestern Bar
SIDNEY PLEASANT of Craig recently was elected president of the Northwestern Bar Association, and Worth Shrimpton was designated as secretarytreasurer.
BERTON T. GOBBLE, former assistant attorney general and inheritance tax
commissioner, has become associated in law practice with C. Henry Anderson
at Brush. Mr. Anderson also was formerly an assistant attorney general.
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Another View of The Basing Point Controversy
By S. ARTHUR HENRY
of the Denver Bar
EDITOR'S NoTE-In DICTA for January, Mr. Robert Freer, retiring chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, discussed the basing point pricing system. This month we
are pleased to be able to present another view of this very controversial subject by a
member of our own association.

In the last several years there has been a series of cases involving the
validity of the so-called "basing point system of pricing" which has been
an accepted pattern of selling for many years, particularly in lines of heavy
industry. A basing point price system has been defined as:
"Sales at delivered prices, computed by adding to the mill price
the cost of transportation from any particular point, known as the
'basing point', usually a place other than the seller's mill or factory.
The term 'single basing point system' is applied when only one basing
point is used by the seller, and the term 'multiple basing point system'
is used when more than one basing point is used by the seller." (C.C.H.
Inc. "Pricing Practices and the Law").
The growing tendency under the multiple basing point system was to
designate the plant nearest to the consuming area as the basing point for
that area; but there were some inconsistencies even within the area, which
resulted in instances of either freight absorbtion or phantom freight. The
base plant, however, did set a ceiling for its area and if a remote seller
desired to penetrate the area where the base plant held a freight advantage,
he would have to absorb freight to do so. Thus in computing the price to
be met, the distant seller would know that it would be the plant price at
such base plant plus actual freight thence to the particular buyer's destination.
This was predicated on recognition of the fact that in uniform products
such as cement, steel, etc. the buyer would not (in any normal market) pay
more for one brand than another and therefore a seller could not invade
a territory where his price was even slightly above the going price in the
particular area. Conversely, the seller recognized that if he undercut the local
basing point plant the latter would either have to cut accordingly or be
unable to effect any sales. Thus there was no incentive to undercut rather
than merely meet competition. Indeed the legality of undercutting might
in itself be challenged (Moss, Inc. v. F. T. C., 148 Fed (2d) 378; Certiorari
denied 326 U. S. 734, 1945).
Obviously it was self-interest that dictated meeting competitive prices
rather than undercutting them. A company with productive capacity in
excess of the demands of its freight advantage area could afford to absorb
freight on shipments penetrating another territory with less ultimate loss of
revenue than if it lowered its whole price structure under direct competition
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on a cutthroat basis of price competition alone, with its attendant risk of
financial collapse.
The ultimate result of such a system of delivered prices calculated to
meet, but not undercut, the existing competition at the point of destination
was to produce substantial uniformity of price among the like products of
the various sellers at the particular destination.
The Statutory Background
In considering the matter of pricing practices, regard must be given to
four federal statutes: First and oldest is the Sherman Anti Trust Act 1 adopted
in 1890 and directed at conspiracies in restraint of trade and utilization or
creation of monopolies. The Act provides criminal penalties but also has
provision for some civil remedies. Next was the Federal Trade Commission
Act 2 adopted in 1914 prohibiting unfair methods of competition, and by
later amendment, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The
Clayton Anti Trust Act' was also adopted in 1914, aimed particularly at
price discriminations which might tend to lessen competition or induce monopoly. In 1936 the Robinson-Patman Act 4 was adopted, amending Section
2 of the Clayton Act and elaborating the prohibitions against price discriminations. Under this Act the matter of collusion or conspiracy is not a factor.
Section 2A and 2B of the Clayton Anti Trust Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, are currently of major interest in the present controversy. Section 2A oulaws discrimination in price where the effect may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. It does not
bar a discrimination, however, which makes "only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery". Section 2B provides that
a seller may rebut proof of a price discrimination by showing that the sale
was "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor * * *"
A good deal of confusion in psychology at least, arises from the fact that
under the Sherman Act the element of overt collusion is mandatory and
criminal penalties are involved. There the parties must actually intend to
conspire to attain the prohibited result. Under the other statutes as now
interpreted by the Commission and the courts, the intent of the parties may
not be material at all, but liability may be imposed for violation because of
actual economic results of a seller's action even though independently taken
without any element of collusion. This clearly suggests that any attempt to
' Act of July 2, 1890, Chap. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended; 15 U. S. Code, Sec-

tions 1-7.

'Act of September 26, 1914, Chap. 311, 38 Stat. '717, as amended; 15 U. S. Code,

Sections 41-51.

'Act of Ocotber 15, 1914, Chap. 323, 38 Stat. 730, as amended; 15 U. S. Code,
Sections 1Z-27, 18 U. S. Code, Section 412, 28 U. S. Code Sections 381-383, 385-390,
29 U. S. Code, Section 52.
4 Act of June 19, 1936, Chap. 592, 49 Stat. 1526; 15 U. S. Code, Sects. 13-13b,
21a.
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evaluate these complicated trade pricing situations from the standpoint of
moral turpitude alone is not a desirable atmosphere within which to attain
a sound and logical conclusion. Under the later statutes it seems clear that
certain results or economic conditions were considered undesirable and therefore prohibited on that basis. The great controversy now is whether the
Federal Trade 'Commission and the Courts, by interpretation, have not advanced the prohibitions of these later statutes so as to render illegal certain
acts, because of their end economic results, which were far beyond the legislative intent in enacting the statutes. There is growing sentiment that it is
now necessary to have a further legislative declaration, either restricting the
scope of such interpretations, or affirming them as within the Congressional
intent.
Recent Cases in Controversy
Necessary limitations of space prevent any complete discussion of the
many cases dealing with this general basing point problem, but the following
recent cases are the ones which figure most prominently in the present rather
heated controversy and are adequate to outline the problem now facing industry:
Corn Products Refining Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 324
U.S. 726; Decided April 23, 1945.
Federal Trade Commission v. Staley Manufacturing Company, et al.
324 U.S. 746; Decided April 23, 1945.
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, et al., 333 U.S. 683;
Decided April 26, 1948.
Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Company, 334 U.S. 37;
Decided May 3, 1948.
Triangle Conduit & Cable Company, Inc., et al., v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 Fed. (2d) 175; Decided May 12, 1948.
United States Steel Corporation, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission,
Fed. (2d) -- ; Decree dated October 5, 1948.
In addition to the above cases, the pending complaint of the Federal
Trade Commission against National Lead Company, et al., (F.T.C. Docket
No. 5253) and the modified cease and desist order of the Commission in the
proceeding against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana (F.T.C. Docket
No. 4389), on which an appeal is now pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, are of immediate significance.
The Corn Products case, supra, involved the use of a single basing point
system of pricing in connection with sales of glucose. Mr. Chief Justice Stone
in delivering the opinion in the case stated the facts on this point as follows:
"They sell only at delivered prices, computed by adding to a base
price at Chicago the published freight tariff from Chicago to the several
points of delivery, even though deliveries are in fact made from their
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factory at Kansas City as well as from their Chicago factory. Consequently there is included in the delivered price on shipments from
Kansas City an amount of 'freight' which usually does not correspond
to freight actually paid by petitioners" (the petitioners being the defending companies).
The court went on to declare this practice illegal and that it constituted an
unlawful price discrimination forbidden by the Robinson-Patman Act. The
significant point here is that the court held illegal a single basing point pricing
system operated by the Corn Products Company, without collusion with
others, on the ground that the results effected price discriminations forbidden
under the Robinson-Patman Act. It should be noted that in this case both
phantom freight and freight absorption were involved.
Under like date the court also decided the Staley case, supra. In the
Staley case, the Staley Company, which was a competitor of Corn Products,
had adopted the latter's basing point pricing policy completely; adopting
Chicago as a basing point because it was Corn Products' basing point. The
company's plant was in Decatur and by adopting the Corn Products Company basing point, purchasers next to the plant in Decatur nevertheless had
to pay a price which included "phantom freight" from Chicago. Here the
court again condemned the results of the system as causing a discrimination
prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act and specifically rejected the contention of the company that the adoption of the competitor's pricing system
could be defended as a good faith attempt to meet competition. It should
also be noted that here again the element of collusion was not involved,
the action taken having been a unilateral proceeding. The case is noteworthy
for the following dictum, the validity of which has been endangered by the
later Cement case. The dictum in question is:
"But it does not follow that respondents may never absorb freight
when their factory price plus actual freight is higher than their competitor's price, or that sellers, by so doing may not maintain a uniform
delivered price at all points of delivery, for in that event there is no
discrimination in price." (Italics ours.)
In other words this dictum specifically says that if delivered prices arising
from freight absorption are uniform there can be no discrimination.
The Cement Institute Case
The case of Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, et al., supra,
commonly referred to as the "Cement" case, was next decided. In the eyes
of industry at least the decision in that case climaxed a long drive by the
Federal Trade Commission to outlaw the basing point system of pricing
completely and in substance to require f.o.b. plant pricing in all heavy industry. The Cement Case decision held illegal a collusive arrangement among
cement producers to adopt a basing point pricing system which resulted in
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substantial identity of price for their product at all points. Technically the
actual decision, strictly read, is not novel. The Circuit Court of Appeals
had not found the existence of collusion and doubted in fact that the Commission had made such a finding. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed
that position and accepted the contention of the Commission that there was
collusion and conspiracy. Accepting that premise, no one can quarrel with
the result of the decision in declaring such conduct illegal. It should be
noted that the affirmation of the prohibitory order of the Commission was
sustained by the Supreme Court with the express comment that it was
directed at " * * * concerted, not individual activity on the part of respondents." However, the implications of the language of the court in this decision
and the positions urged by the Commission went so far beyond the technical
scope of the decision and were felt by industry in general to be so ominous
that a storm of controversy immediately arose.
The actual decision of the court in the Cement case was that a multiple
basing point price system operated collusively in attaining substantial identity
of delivered price was illegal both as a price discrimination prohibited by the
Robinson-Patman Act and as an unfair method of competition in violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Sherman Act was not involved.
The court also discussed at length the two previous decisions in the Corn
Products and Staley cases and flatly stated, "Thus the combined effect of
the two cases was to forbid the adoption for sales purposes of any basing
point pricing system."
In substance, in its attack, the Commission seems to have proceeded on
the view that freight absorption as a factor in a pricing system resulting
in substantial uniformity of delivered prices among different sellers is inherently a collusive practice and should be branded collusive per se. In addition, on the question of price discrimination the Commission strongly urged
its favorite theory that there has in fact been a discrimination in price whenever after freight costs are deducted there is a difference between transactions
in the net realization at the mill. As the Commission itself has said in its
statement of policy of October 12, 1948 (as amended Oct. 21, 1948):
"According to this test, all forms of geographic pricing, except f.o.b.
mill pricing without freight equalization, must necessarily create price
differences if the seller makes sales over any considerable area."
It is true that under the Robinson-Patman Act all price discriminations are
not condemned and a price discrimination is valid if it can be justified by
cost factors involved or if made in good faith to meet the equally low price
of a competitor.
The Supreme Court in deciding the Cement case, while not expressly
declaring the basing point price system as illegal and collusive per se, did
appear to embrace the position of the Commission on practically all its contentions and, as noted, regarded the Corn Products case and the Staley case
as forbidding "the adoption for sales purposes of any basing point pricing
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system." The decision also seems flatly to overrule the dictum in the Staley
case to the effect that delivered prices if uniform, even though arising from
freight absorption, could not be considered discriminatory. In other words
if the "mill net" concept of price is accepted as the test of discrimination,
then obviously freight absorption is just as bad as phantom freight, since
the mill net would vary to the extent of freight absorbed.
The Dilemma of Industry
Thus, upon the decision of the Cement case, industry was faced with
two sharply controverted questions: First, did the decision forbid an
individual company to absorb freight in penetrating a distant market even
if there was no collusion or conspiracy in fact or did it forbid only the use
of freight absorption when practiced under collusion or agreement in a price
conspiracy? Second, did the decision outlaw any pricing method even though
independently operated which in fact resulted in varying mill nets to the
mill on different transactions?
The rigid Steel Conduit case, supra, followed quickly after the Cement
case decision and did little to reassure industry. In fact, it was regarded as
the last straw. This decision, it should be noted, is not that of the United
States Supreme Court, but of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The significant point in this decision was the concurrence by the
court in the contention of the Commission that individual use of a basing
point pricing method without collusion but with knowledge that other sellers
used a like system constituted an unfair method of competition under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. In commenting on this case in its statement
of policy issued October 12, and corrected October 21, 1948, the Commission
rather significantly said:
11** * The Commission chose to rely on the obvious fact that the
economic effect of identical prices achieved through conscious parallel
action is the same as that of similar prices achieved through overt collu,
sion, and, for this reason, the Commission treated the conscious parallelism of action as violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Should
the Supreme Court sustain the Commission's view the effect will be to
simplify proof in basing point cases, but to expose to proceedings under
the Federal Trade Commission Act only courses of action which might
be regarded as collusive or destructive of price competition." (Italics
ours.)
Suffice it to say that to many business men this looks remarkably like a
situation where they can be convicted of collusion and conspiracy without
regard to the fact, whenever the Commission chooses to determine that there
has been a sufficient identity of delivered price in any industry to cause the
Commission to "feel" that competition may be hindered or impeded even
though such identity of price was not obtained through overt collusion.
The Morton Salt case was not a basing point case but is relevant and of
interest. There the Commission attacked a standard quantity discount sys-
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tern of the Morton Salt Company which graduated downward the price per
case on salt according to certain quantity brackets. The lowest bracket being
that on 50,000 case purchases in any consecutive twelve months, where the
price was' cut to $1.35 per case as compared to a price of $1.60 per case for
less than carload purchases which was at the other end of the scale. The
Commission, after hearing, found that this was a discriminnation in price
between different purchasers and in violation of paragraph 2 of the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act prohibiting discriminations
not justified by cost factors. The noteworthy and controversial point in this
decision was the ruling of the court that the Robinson-Patman Act does not
require the Commission to find that the discriminations complained of in
fact harmed competition but only that there is a "reasonable possibility" that
they "may" have such an effect. This significant departure is objected to by
Mr. Justice Jackson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring, in the dissenting
opinion in which he said:
"While I agree with much of the Court's opinion, I cannot accept its most significant feature, which is a new interpretation of the
Robinson-Patman Act that will sanction prohibition of any discounts
'if there is a reasonable possibility that they "may" have' the effect towit: to lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition. (Emphasis supplied). I think the law written by the Congress and as always interpreted by this Court requires that the record show a reasonable probability of that effect. The difference as every lawyer knows, is not un,
important and in many cases would be decisive."
"The Court uses overtones of hostility to all quantity discounts,
which I do not find in the Act, but they are translated into a rule which
is fatal to any discount the Commission sees fit to attack. To say it is
the law that the Commission may strike down any discount 'upon the
reasonable possibility' that different prices for like goods to competing
purchasers 'may' substantially injure competition, coupled with the
almost absolute subservience of judicial judgment to administrative experience, cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
332 U.S. 194, means that judicial review is a word of promise to the
ear to be broken to the hope. The law of this case, in a nutshell, is that
no quantity discount is valid if the Commission chooses to say it is not.
That is not the law which Congress enacted and which this Court has
uniformly stated until today."
Big Steel Abandons "Pittsburgh Plus"
The impact of these decisions was too much even for big U.S. Steel, and
under date of October 5, 1948, a consent decree was entered terminating a
controversy between U.S. Steel and the Commission which had been more
or less in active debate since entry of a cease and desist order against certain
practices of the Steel Company by the F.T.C. on July 21, 1924. Under the
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terms of the consent decree, so far as relevant to this discussion, the Steel
Companies were ordered to cease and desist from any further use of the
so-called "Pittsburgh plus" price system of selling, and from quoting for
sale or selling steel upon any other basing point than that where the products
are manufactured or from which they are actually shipped.
By reference to the "Pittsburgh plus" pricing system was meant the steel
company's former practice of charging freight on all sales wherever delivered,
in like amount as if the shipment had actually originated at Pittsburgh.
In the Standard Oil Company case, supra, now pending in the Court of
Appeals, the Commission seeks to test whether or not a defendant who has
given a price discrimination which has the required adverse effect on competition can justify and sustain such discrimination by proof that it actually
arose by meeting competition in good faith. In the National Lead case, supra,
the Commission is attacking a system of uniform delivered prices within a
zone. The Commission charges that such a uniform delivered price within
the particular zone constitutes an illegal discrimination. On the discrimination point the Commission again asserted its belief that "net mill realizations" are the only guide in determining a discrimination. It is perfectly
obvious that, if varying "mill net" is the test, discrimination exists in any
zone pricing system, both as between near and distant points in the same
zone and between two zones themselves, at or near the point of overlap.

Zone Price Systems Are Out
If the pattern laid by the earlier cases noted continues, the chances of
vindicating a zone pricing system or uniform delivered prices within the
particular zones would appear to be remote. In like fashion it would appear
that even a nationwide "one-price delivered" system would be prohibited
since it is obvious that as to deliveries made at other than identical points
having identical transportation charges incident thereto discrimination would
exist since freight or transportation costs would be absorbed to some extent
on deliveries at remote points and, conversely, phantom freight received on
deliveries at nearby points.
At least one member of the Commission in summarizing the effect of
the several recent decisions flatly stated before the Capehart Committee investigating the impact of these decisions upon business, that in his opinion:
"That the multiple basing point pricing system, which does not
take into account every point of production, is out as a matter of law."
* * * "Freight absorption is out. By that I mean that it will be a
violation of the law merchant for anyone to use a systematic
pricing system which allows him to pay the freight out of his own
pocket in order to sell in a competitor's territory." (Commissioner
Mason.)
Although the Commission itself has indicated that it limits its challenge
of freight absorption to situations where the element of freight would be a
substantial factor in determining cost, the Vice-chairman of the Commission,
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Mr. Mason, does not so agree and again in testifying before the Capehart
Committee, stated:
"Now, Mr. Chairman, this in my opinion goes from pins and
needles on up, for I know of no accepted doctrine in this country,
which applies the law to one commodity, and not to others. The
pattern of law is a universal pattern, and to justify a law on the basis
that it will not or cannot be equally applied, is in itself a confession
of weakness. And I hope that no one will challenge this statement on
the basis that administrative agencies will not force everybody to obey
the law.
"Zone -prices are out. Zone prices are essentially part of an individual pricing system." * * * "It may be urged that my statement of
the law is too broad, and that freight absorption and zone prices and
even individual universal delivered price systems are not banned unless
there is a probability of a tendency to restrain trade.
"These words are too tenuous for many to grasp. In my opinion
anyone who uses freight absorption, zone prices, or an individual universal delivered price system, operates under the shadow of illegality
and certainly is taking a calculated risk."
Although Mr. Mason's remarks concerning the results of the Commission's activities are not too happily looked upon by his colleagues on the
Commission, it should be noted that the Commission itself in its formal
statement of policy of last October indicated that the chance of defending
a price discrimination evidenced by a varying mill or factory net, under the
plea that competition was merely being met, was remote. The statement says:
"It may be presumed that wherever there is an industry-wide
pattern of parallel geographic prices, the claim on the part of one
company that it is merely meeting competition will fail. It may also
be presumed that this claim will fail where there are phantom freight
charges and where formula prices are followed regardless of the existence of competition.
"From these presumptions, it appears improbable that the defense
of meeting competition can be successfully offered in cases involving
systematic matching of delivered price quotations through single or
multiple basing point systems or the more complicated types of zone
price systems. It may also be presumed that such a defense will be
unsuccessful in the case of industry-wide systematic freight equalization."
However, even in its somewhat conciliatory statement of policy of last
October, the Commission has evidenced no growth in friendship for the
basing point system. In that statement the Commission said:
"The collusive character of basing point pricing is not destroyed
as the number of basing points is increased. A logical culmination of
the increase in the number of bases, which has been evident in various
industries during the last quarter century, would be the establishment
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of every mill as a base. Under such circumstances, a basing point
system would be indistinguishable from an f.o.b. mill system with
systematic freight absorption wherever necessary to equalize delivered
prices. Complexity and rigidity would be as characteristic of such a
system as of systems with fewer bases and the freight absorption formula
could be used as readily to bring about identical delivered prices and
eliminate price competition. The only significant difference between
such a system of freight absorption and basing point pricing would
lie in the elimination of phantom freight, which would remove some
of the anomalies that make basing point systems appear highly artificial.
This difference is not sufficient, however, to preclude a presumption that
systematic industry-wide adherence to such a freight absorption formula
is a collusive device."

Only Rigid F.O.B Price System Left
Reviewing the foregoing and judging the Commission by its actions and
its carefully formulated statements, it seems to me to be extremely difficult
to do other than regard f.o.b. plant pricing as the only pricing system which
at the present time is immune from the charge of illegality. It would appear
that even individual non-collusive freight absorption on any systematic basis
.is outlawed. It is obvious that the right to absorb freight in a sporadic or
unsystematic manner, in individual transactions only, is an illusion so far as
practical utilization by business or industry is concerned.
Such a reversal of hitherto generally accepted business practices in geographic pricing systems holds many implications. The writer does not pretend to be an economist, but it seems to be obvious that a rigid f.o.b. pattern
of geographic pricing would tend to stimulate industries at, and to draw
industries to, heavy consumption centers. It would appear equally true that
a plant located near a sparsely populated area where the consumptive demand
of its freight advantage area would not consume its entire output would be
foreclosed from penetrating distant markets unless it could absorb freight
in so doing. To a plant so located that its freight advantage area can consume
its entire output at the level which is at the optimum level for efficient production there would be no hazards, but there are few, if any, such plants.
If f.o.b. selling is to be the basic pattern in industry, a number of sellers
may have to retire from the market area. There may develop a Balkanization
of industry with each producing center having its monopoly circle of freight
advantage territory. Territory might well be divided by freight rate cleavages
as accurately and in more detail perhaps than could have been done under
agreement. Certainly industry would have to resurvey the advantages and
disadvantages of location of their plants at particular points. Plants which
,in the past were located in reliance on the historical right of business to
absorb freight in penetrating distant markets and which have grown prosperous
under that policy may have some rude awakenings.
These are not pointless possibilities, yet the Commission is apparently
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not concerned by such. Its associate general counsel who for years has been
a brilliant advocate for the requirement of f.o.b. mill pricing and the elimination of freight absorption, in testifying before the Capehart Committee
said:
"I would not question that if the cement decision were applied
there would have to be some changes, and that some concerns that
formerly have been well located with reference to the market and raw
materials and all that, would find themselves not so well located."
I should like to make it very clear that this is not intended as an attack
upon the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission is a very useful body.
It did not originate through accident, but was created in recognition of a
very definite need. Industry has not always been as socially conscious as it
should have been. Likewise in industry as elsewhere, there will always be
those who will value immediate individual profit more highly than long-range
stability and the public good. Unfortunately business society still needs a
policeman to some extent. The conventional antitrust laws against collusion,
conspiracy and monopoly are pretty well understood and I think have the
full support both of business and the public. It would not be in the interest
of business itself to seek to invalidate or weaken the statutes and I think to
try to accuse business of attempting to do so is highly misleading.
Major Areas of Confusion
There is definitely confusion on at least three major points in the field of
pricing practices. First: whether substantially identical prices at various
locations as between any substantial number of sellers is practically conclusive
evidence of collusion. Second: whether freight absorption is wholly outlawed
except in sporadic "non-systematic" individual instances. Third: the proper
definition of "price." To the average businessman "price" is what he pays for
the commodity in his own marketplace; to the Commission it is the "mill net"
at the particular seller's plant.
As the situation now stands sellers of standardized products on a broad
geographic plane, which tend to seek a like price level, are almost inevitably
driven to a system of f.o.b. prices. There are too many risks and unanswered
questions any other way. To my mind, this involves a drastic decision between competing economic theories and I would fear a decision which would
put industry into a straight-jacket of pricing practices with escape only for
sporadic and non-systematic "hit and run" or dumping forays into competitors' territory.
If long-established business methods are to be overturned, if there is apt
to result a substantial reallocation of industries (and whether that be good
or bad in ultimate result), so drastic a revision ought to have some express
legislative sanction rather than being predicated upon the economic philosophy
of a Federal bureau. This is even more obvious when the governmental
agency involved is itself rife with internal dissension and its key personnel
have publicly stated flatly divergent views both of law and philosophy.
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Business needs to "know the rules." It is durable enough and flexible
enough to adjust and adapt itself to rules it may dislike and even resist,
but it needs, and it is certainly entitled to, some clarification as to what the
rules are.

The Public Information Program of The Junior
Bar Section
By Louis I.

HART, JR.

Colorado State Director

The Public Information Program of the Junior Bar Section will get
under way when qualified Junior Bar members make their appearances at
high schools throughout the State to give informal vocational talks about
the profession generally, and about such related topics as law enforcement, which seem to be of special interest to high school age groups. A
question and answer period after the talk is to be provided.
This is the first phase of the 1948-1949 program undertaken by the
Public Information Branch of the Junior Bar Section. Letters have been
sent to various members of the Junior Bar in most cities and towns of the
State requesting that they address high school groups. In addition, letters
have gone out to the particular principals of high schools in these communities
advising them of our interest in vocational guidance and of the fact that
there is available for whatever vocational program the school may have, a
qualified member of the Junior Bar to give an informal talk about the profession.
This program is not a paper gesture, it has passed the planning stage
and is on the assembly line, so to speak. Upon the successful completion of
this project, the Junior Bar Section has on its drafting board a plan whereby
qualified members will thoroughly investigate individual bills of particular
interest to a given community and following such investigation, these members of the Junior Bar will present non-partisan, factual reports on the bill
to interested groups in the community.

Old Copies of Dicta Available
With the centralization of the office of the Denver and Colorado bar
associations, extra copies of the following issues of DICTA have come to light
and will gladly be sent to anyone requesting them:
1939-February, March, May and June.
1941-February.
1943-June.
1944-February, July, August, September, November, December.
1946-May, June, September, October, December.
1947-January, March, June, July, August, September, October
November and December.

DICTA

The Survey of the Legal Profession
(The January DICTA carried an excerpt from a speech by President Frank
Holman of the American Bar Association in which he described the general
purpose and organization of the Survey. Another excerpt from the same
speech is reprinted below describing in greater detail the six divisions of the
Survey.)
The first division of the Survey is concerned with what lawyers do, and
whether or not their services are available and adequate to persons in need.
Legal aid, public defenders, and lawyer reference plans are being studied,
among other things, under this heading.
The second division comprises the following subjects: What lawyers do
in wartime, in and out of the services; what they do with respect to labor relations and the Bill of Rights; public relations; civil service and community
activities so far as they have to do with lawyers.
The emphasis in Division III is on the lawyer's role with respect to our
adjudicative bodies. This would include his work in judicial councils and
his responsibility for explaining to the public how the judges may be wisely
selected. The judicial service of lawyers will be surveyed by fact-finding
forays into both the courts and the administrative agencies.
This Survey is not designed to conduct any studies of substantive law,
nor did its architects contemplate delving into the intricacies of judicial administration. What a judge does as a judge is important to the lawyer, of
course, and to the community as a whole. But the central concern of the
Survey is what the lawyer does as a lawyer. Surveys of problems in the
administration of the courts are relatively frequent, whereas the lawyer himself has been neglected.
Division IV, Professional Competence and Integrity, has three subdivisions of the highest importance in the Survey. Legal education, admission
to the Bar, and professional ethics (including discipline) are in the capable
hands of exceptionally well-qualified consultants. Every law school in the
United States will be visited. All the Bar admission methods are being examined. Extensive questionnaires have gone out to ascertain the state of professional ethics. Both pre-legal education and post-legal education will be
treated.
The Economics of the Legal Profession, Division V, is an area where
the existing facts are almost wholly unknown. Various surveys for other
purposes, including one by the Department of Commerce, have pointed out the
great absence of any real information regarding the economics of the legal
profession.
There has always been much talk about the over-crowding of the Bar,
but no one has really been able to talk with any real knowledge of the subject. In fact, no one is sure how many lawyers there are and just where they
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are. The Survey proposes to find this out. The Department of Commerce,
in cooperation with the Survey, has prepared an income questionnaire and
sent it to 21,000 lawyers throughout the country. Other findings must be made
of legal expenses as related to the consumer's budget. Interesting facts will
doubtless be developed regarding the economic implications of individual and
organization practice of the law; of retirement and security; and of the
unauthorized practice of law.
As already indicated, the purpose of all the plans and organization of
the Survey is to find facts about the lawyer's function in a democratic society.
As to current results, reports on legal aid organizations and lawyer reference plans are almost all in at this date. One of these reports, the Koos
Report, by Professor Koos of the University of Rochester, was based on interviews and questionnaires filled out by more than 2,000 lower income families and the same number of middle income families. These families were
located in six specially selected cities-Akron, Atlanta, Nashville, Oakland,
Rochester and Seattle. The report shows that there is a tremendous but largely
unrealized need for legal assistance in both the middle and lower income groups,
particularly of the preventive sort. The report shows a shocking misapprehension of what a lawyer does and what he is likely to charge. Three out of five
middle income families and only slightly more than two out of five lower income families used the lawyer's services in instances where such services were
definitely needed.
Each of the major topics, and there are several in each Division, may
ultimately be reported by a separate volume when the Survey is finished.
The first such book may appear next year. Others will follow as the work
progresses. * * *

The Army Has a Code--But Still in the Head
We are informed via a reprint from the Army Information Digest that
work on the recodification of Army law begun last March is now well under
way. It is estimated that 54 percent of the wordage now contained in Federal
statutory provisions pertaining to the Army and National Guard will be eliminated in the process. Top brass hope to be able to present the completed code
to the second session of the 81st Congress in 1950.

H. LAWRENCE HINKLEY, former attorney general, recently, opened an office
for the practice of law at 411-14 E. & C. Building, Denver.

and WILLIAM 0. DESOUCHET,
formation of a partnership at Alamosa.
RAPHAEL J. MOSES

JR.,

have announced the
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Correction of Article on Judiciary Plan
It has been called to our attention that there is an error in the article
"The Judiciary Committee Plan and the 1949 General Assembly," by Stanley
H. Johnson, as printed in the December (1948) DICTA. Part of the last paragraph on page 288 of that issue reads: "When the terms of the present
judges expire, their offices will become vacant. Then, as now, the Governor
will fill the vacancies by appointment but he must select from three nominees
(except in the case of county judges in counties under 10,000) selected by
impartial nominating commissions."
Such is neither the plan nor the provision of the proposed constitutional
amendment as introduced in the legislature. That portion of the paragraph
should read: "When the term of a present judge expires, he will run against
himself on his record. If the judge is defeated, the Governor will fill the
vacancy by appointment, but he must select from three nominees (except in
the case of counties under 10,000 population) made by an impartial nominating commission."

Page From an Editor's Scrapbook
When Booth Malone was district attorney for the Second Judicial District, the Hon. George F. Dunklee, later to become district judge, defended
a young man accused of rape, and at his trial soon saw that unless he could
discredit the prosecuting witness, his client would be convicted. He put on
a male witness, who had some difficulty with his adopted tongue, to testify
that the reputation of the prosecuting witness for truth and veracity was bad.
On cross-examination:
D.A.: "Did you ever observe her veracity?"
Witness: "Yes."
D.A.: "Where?"
Witness: "In a swimming pool in the Platte."
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